Panama
Guaymi Indians Part Two
The Guaymí link to the
national economy not only provided cash for the purchase of
a variety of consumer goods but also acted as a safety
valve, relieving the pressure on land. Their dependence on
this link was evident during the 1960s, when the Guaymí
endured a real hardship because of a decline in demand for
labor on banana plantations.
Settlement patterns among
the Guaymí were intimately linked to kinship and social
organization. Hamlets, each typically representing a single
extended family, were scattered throughout the territory.
There were no larger settlements of any permanence serving
as trading or ceremonial centers. A few mestizo towns on the
fringes of Guaymí territory served as trading posts.
Each hamlet was ideally
composed of a group of related males, their wives, and their
unmarried children. Nevertheless, this general rule glossed
over residence patterns of considerable fluidity and
complexity. At least at some points in an individual's life,
he or she resided in a three-generation household.
Households, however, took many forms, including nuclear
families; polygamous households; groups of brothers, their
wives, and unmarried children; a couple, their unmarried
children, and married sons and their wives and children; or
a mother, her married sons, and their wives and children.
A hamlet defined an
individual's social identity, and access to land and
livelihood was gained through residence in a specific
hamlet. Typically, a person's closest kin resided there. The
wide variety of family forms represented in hamlets
reflected the diverse ways individual Guaymí used the ties
of kinship to gain access to land. Depending on the
availability of plots, an individual couple might live with
the husband's family (the ideal), the wife's kin, the
husband's mother (if his parents did not live together), the
husband's mother's kin, or his father's mother's kin.
Guaymí had pronounced
notions about which tasks were appropriately male or female;
but men would build fires, cook, and care for children if
necessary and women would, as the occasion demanded, weed
and chop firewood. Women were never supposed to clear
forest, herd cattle, or hunt. Nonetheless, a measure of
expediency dictated who actually performed the required
duties. Because most men migrated to look for employment, a
significant segment of the agricultural work force was
absent for lengthy periods of time. Consequently, women
assumed a larger share of the farm work during those
absences. Their own male kinsmen helped with the heavier
tasks. Children began assisting their parents at
approximately eight years of age. By the time a girl was
fourteen to fifteen years old and a boy seventeen to
eighteen, they were expected to do the work of an adult.
Sharing of food and labor
was an important form of exchange among kin. If a hamlet
needed food, a woman or child would be sent to solicit food
from relatives. Kin also formed a common labor pool for
virtually all of the agricultural work. Guaymí did not hire
each other as wage laborers. Non-kin assisted each other
only for specific festive or communal works. Within the
hamlet, all able-bodied family members were expected to
contribute labor. Kin from different hamlets exchanged labor
on a day-by-day basis. Individuals were careful not to incur
too many obligations so as not to compromise their own
household's agricultural production. Those who received
assistance were obliged to provide food, meat, and chicha
(a kind of beer) for all the workers. Moreover, there was
supposed to be enough food to send a bit home with each
worker.
Marriage was the primary
means by which Guaymí created social ties to other
(non-kin) Guaymí. The ramifications of marriage exchanges
extended far beyond the couple concerned. The selection of a
spouse was the choice of an allied group and reflected
broader concerns such as access to land and wealth,
resolution of longstanding disputes, or acquisition of an
ally in a previously nonaligned party.
Fathers usually arranged
marriages for children. An agreement was marked by a visit
of the groom and his parents to the home of the prospective
bride and her family. The marriage itself was fixed through
a series of visits between the two households involved. No
formal ceremony marked the event. Ideally, marriage
arrangements were to be balanced exchanges between two kin
groups.
Initially the young
couple resided with the bride's parents because a son-in-law
owed his parents-in-law labor. Thus, a bride usually did not
leave her natal hamlet for at least a year. For the husband,
persuading his wife to leave her family and join his was a
major, and often insurmountable, hurdle. If the marriage
conformed to the ideal of a balanced exchange, however, a
husband's task was considerably easier in that his wife had
to join him or her brother would not receive a wife.
Young men in groups
without daughters to exchange in marriage were at a
disadvantage. Although they could (and did) ask for wives
without giving a sister in return, the fathers of the brides
gained significantly. A son-in-law whose family did not
provide a bride to his wife's family faced longer labor
obligations to his in-laws and uncertainty about when, or
if, his wife would join him and his family.
A minority of all
marriages was polygamous. Traditionally, a man's ability to
support more than one wife was testimony to his wealth and
prestige. Co-wives were often sisters. A man could marry his
wife's younger sister after he had established a household
and acquired sufficient resources to support two families.
Wives lived together until their sons matured and married.
At that time, an extended household would reconstitute
itself around a woman and her married sons and their wives
and children. Younger wives in polygynous marriages had a
tendency to leave their husbands as they aged. A reasonably
successful Guaymí man might expect to begin his married
life in a monogamous union, have several wives, as he grew
wealthier, and finish his life again in a monogamous
marriage.
In general, there were
few external indications of differences in wealth, and there
was no formal ranking of status in Guaymí society. Prestige
accrued to the individual Guaymí male who was able to
demonstrate largesse in meeting his obligations to kin and
in-laws. A young man began to gain the respect of his
in-laws by providing them well with food and labor. He
further demonstrated his abilities by farming his own plots
well enough to provide for his family and those of his kin
who visited.
An individual might also
gain prestige through his ability to settle differences.
Historically, disputes between Guaymí were settled at
public meetings chaired by a person skilled in arbitration.
An individual's prestige was in proportion to his ability to
reach a consensus among the parties involved in the dispute.
In present-day Guaymí society, a government-appointed
representative decided the case. Guaymí gained prestige by
proposing settlements more acceptable to the disputants than
those of the government representative. As an individual's
reputation spread, other disputants sought him out to
arbitrate. The entire process emphasized the extent to which
indigenous political structures were acephalous and loosely
organized. There were no durable, well-organized, non-kin
groups that functioned in the political sphere;
decision-making was largely informal and consensual.
In
the 1980s, government plans to develop the Cerro Colorado
copper mine, along the Cordillera Central in eastern Chiriquí
Province, gave impetus to the efforts of some Guaymí to
organize politically. Most of the mining project as well as
a planned slurry pipeline, a highway, and the Changuinola I
Hydroelectric Project were in territory occupied by the
Guaymí. Guaymí attended a number of congresses to protect
their claims to land and publicize their misgivings about
the projects. The Guaymí were concerned about the
government's apparent lack of interest in their plight,
about the impact on their lands, and their productivity, and
about the effect of dam construction on fishing and water
supplies. Guaymí were also worried that proposed cash
indemnification payments for lands or damages would be of
little benefit to them in the long run. As of late 1987,
however, the matter had not been fully resolved.
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